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A most debated topic of the last years is whether simple statistical physics models can explain
collective features of social dynamics. A necessary step in this line of endeavour is to find regularities
in data referring to large scale social phenomena, such as scaling and universality. We show that, in
proportional elections, the distribution of the number of votes received by candidates is a universal
scaling function, identical in different countries and years. This finding reveals the existence in the
voting process of a general microscopic dynamics that does not depend on the historical, political
and/or economical context where voters operate. A simple dynamical model for the behaviour of
voters, similar to a branching process, reproduces the universal distribution.
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Many social nontrivial phenomena emerge sponta-
neously out of the mutual influence of a large number
of individuals [1, 2, 3, 4], similarly to large-scale ther-
modynamic behavior resulting from the interaction of
a huge number of atoms or molecules. However, hu-
man interactions are neither purely mechanical nor repro-
ducible, both typical requirements for a physical descrip-
tion of a process. Nevertheless the collective behavior of
large groups of individuals may be independent of the
details of social interactions and individual psychologi-
cal attributes, and be instead the consequence of generic
properties of the elementary interactions, allowing for a
simple ’statistical physics’ modeling.
In this spirit, microscopic models have been recently
proposed to account for collective social phenomena, like
the formation of consensus on a specific topic [5, 6, 7], the
creation of common cultural traits and their dissemina-
tion [8], the origin and evolution of language [9, 10], etc.
While models are studied quantitatively in great detail,
the comparison with real-world social phenomena is often
merely qualitative and on this account it is not possible
to make a real discrimination between competing mod-
els. This in turn limits their predictive power, making it
unclear if there is at all a gain in the understanding of
social dynamics through statistical physics.
Elections are an ideal playground for a quantitative
validation of the approach to social dynamics inspired by
physics. They constitute a precise global measurement of
the state of the opinions of the electorate. A large number
of individuals are involved and big datasets are available
for many countries, thus allowing accurate quantitative
investigations.
In this paper we present compelling evidence that elec-
tions data display properties of more traditional physical
phenomena characterized by collective behavior and self-
organization, i.e. scaling and universality. We show that,
in proportional elections, the distribution of the number
of votes received by candidates is universal, i.e. it is the
same function in different countries and years, when the
number of votes is rescaled according to the strength of
the party each candidate belongs to. We claim that the
universal voting behavior is due to the spreading of the
word of mouth from the candidate to the voters, which
we model as a sort of branching process involving the
acquaintances of a candidate.
Early studies revealed that the histogram of the frac-
tion ν of voters supporting a candidate within a con-
stituency in Brazilian parliamentary elections is de-
scribed by a 1/ν law, in the central part of the range
of the variable ν [11, 12, 13]. A successive analysis of In-
dian elections [14] found a similar yet different histogram,
hinting that the distribution of the fraction of votes ν
may exhibit some degree of universality. We have per-
formed the same analysis on German, French, Italian and
Polish elections [15], finding marked differences between
the various countries: the 1/ν pattern is not general.
This lack of universality is a consequence of the fact
that the number of votes a candidate receives is the com-
bination of two distinct factors: how many of the total
number of electors vote for the candidate’s party and the
personal appeal of the candidate within the restricted
pool of voters for his/her party. The first factor strongly
depends on policy-related issues: typically voters know
the position of all parties with respect to the political
issues they deem more relevant and they select the party
that best matches their personal views. The second fac-
tor is instead practically independent from political is-
sues. Since candidates of the same party mostly share a
common set of opinions on ethical, social and economical
issues, the selection of a specific candidate has not to do
with such issues, rather it depends on a “personal” inter-
action between the candidate and the voters. Typically
voters know at most a few of the candidates in their party
list, and in this small subset they select the one they will
2support. Successful candidates are those able to establish
some form of direct or indirect contact with many poten-
tial voters during the electoral campaign. This type of
opinion dynamics is likely to give rise to universal phe-
nomena. The histogram of the total fraction ν of votes
may conceal the actual regularities due to the voter dy-
namics, as it entangles the two factors: a very popular
candidate of a small party can have the same number of
votes (but for completely different reasons) of a relatively
unpopular candidate of a very large party.
In the following we focus on the second factor, how
the electors of each party select candidates in their party
list. This rules out systems based on single member con-
stituencies, where every party/coalition presents a single
candidate in each electoral district, as well as propor-
tional elections with closed lists, where voters are not
allowed to express preferences among party candidates:
in this case the ranking of candidates of a party is pre-
determined by the party.
The most suitable elections to investigate the ele-
mentary voter dynamics are proportional elections with
multiple-seat constituencies and open lists. In this elec-
toral system, the country is divided in districts, and each
of them allocates a certain number of seats, Qmax, typi-
cally between 10 and 30. Within each district, each party
l presents a list of Ql ≤ Qmax candidates. Voters choose
one of the parties and also express their preference among
the candidates of the selected party. Each party gets nl
of the total number of seats, in proportion to the num-
ber of votes it has received in the district. The nl most
voted candidates of party l are elected. In this way, the
party plays no role as to which of its candidates will be
eventually elected, their success depending only on the
free choice of voters.
We have considered three countries with such type of
electoral system: Italy (until 1992), Poland and Finland.
We use publicly available [16] data sets for three elections
in Italy (1958, 1972, 1987), one in Poland (2005) and one
in Finland (2003). The total number of candidates ranges
from 2, 029 for the Finnish elections in 2003 to 10, 658 for
the Polish elections in 2005.
To factor out the policy-related role of the parties, we
keep track, for candidate i that receives vi votes, also of
two other parameters: Qli , i.e. the number of candidates
of the party list li, where i belongs, andNli , total number
of votes collected by the Qli candidates of list li.
The distribution of the number of votes collected by
candidates is in general a function of the three variables
P (v,Q,N). We show instead that P (v,Q,N) is actu-
ally a function of a single rescaled variable. We start
by showing that P (v,Q,N) does not depend on N and
Q separately, but only on the ratio v0 = N/Q, which is
the average number of votes collected by a candidate in
his/her list. The curves of Fig. 1A correspond to three
different values of v0. Since v0 is a continuous variable,
fixing v0 actually means selecting those lists with values
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FIG. 1: A. Scaling behavior of the distribution of votes re-
ceived by candidates. Data refer to the Italian parliamentary
elections in 1972, but we obtained very similar results from
the analysis of each dataset. The histogram P (v,Q,N) only
depends on the ratio v0 = N/Q, so P (v,Q,N) = P0(v, v0).
B. The function P0(v, v0) shown in A only depends on the
ratio v/v0 = vQ/N . Data refer to the Italian parliamentary
elections in 1972.
of v0 within a narrow range. For each value of v0 we fix a
threshold for the total number N of votes and further fil-
ter the data by separating the lists with N larger/smaller
than the threshold. For a fixed v0, the resulting his-
tograms are the same for both data samples, proving that
the distribution P (v,Q,N) is actually only a function of
the arguments v and v0, P0(v, v0).
But a close inspection of the function P0(v, v0) re-
veals that the dependence on two variables is actually
only apparent: the distribution of the rescaled variable
v/v0 = vQ/N turns out to be independent of v0. Again,
we filter the data by putting together candidates belong-
ing to lists such that the ratio v0 = N/Q falls in one
of four narrow windows. For each set of candidates we
derive the histogram of the rescaled variable v/v0: the
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FIG. 2: Universality of the scaling function F (vQ/N) across
different countries and years. The lognormal fit, performed on
the Polish curve, describes very well the data. The universal
curve is well reproduced by our model, where the dynamics
of the voters’ opinions reflects the spreading of the word of
mouth in the party’s electorate.
four curves have a remarkable overlap, so there is no de-
pendence on v0 but only on v/v0 (Fig. 1B). We conclude
that P (v,Q,N) is actually a function of the single vari-
able vQ/N , i.e.
P (v,Q,N) = F (vQ/N). (1)
Since v0 = N/Q is the average number of votes collected
by a candidate in his/her list, the ratio vQ/N = v/v0
is an index of the performance of a candidate against
his/her competitors in the same list. If v/v0 < 1, the
candidate has received less votes than average; if v/v0 ≫
1, he/she performed much better than average.
Eq. 1 indicates that each election can be characterized
by a single function F (vQ/N). A comparison between
the scaling functions F for all five data sets is presented in
Fig. 2 and gives an even more striking result: the scaling
function F (vQ/N) is the same for different countries and
years. The universal curve is very well reproduced by a
lognormal function, i.e.
F (vQ/N) =
N√
2piσvQ
e−(log(vQ/N)−µ)
2/2σ2 , (2)
with µ = −0.54, σ2 = −2µ = 1.08. The relation σ2 =
−2µ is due to the fact that the expected value of the
variable vQ/N = v/v0 = 1 and that the expected value
of a lognormal distributed variable is exp(µ+ σ2/2).
The universality of the distribution F (vQ/N) is truly
remarkable. The elections considered span a period of
thirty years, in which deep cultural, economic and social
transformations have occurred: there is no hint of that
in the data pattern. Likewise, differences between coun-
tries as diverse as Italy, Poland and Finland do not play
any role. This calls for a modelization in terms of sim-
ple mechanisms of interaction between voters (and can-
candidate
FIG. 3: Spreading of the word of mouth among voters. The
candidate (right) convinces some of his/her contacts to vote
for him/her. The convinced voters become “activists” and
try to convince some of their acquaintances, and so on. Suc-
cessful interactions are indicated by solid lines, unsuccessful
interactions are displayed as dashed lines.
didates), regardless of the details of the social, cultural
and economic environment.
The spreading of word of mouth is known to be a very
effective vehicle of diffusion of new products among po-
tential buyers [17]. We interpret the electoral results
using a simple opinion dynamics model based on word
of mouth: electors that have already chosen a candidate
try to convince their peers to vote for the same candidate
(Fig. 3). At the beginning, only candidates have an opin-
ion (they vote for themselves). The dynamics starts with
the candidates trying to convince their acquaintances.
The people convinced by each candidate become activists
and in turn try to convince their contacts to vote for their
candidate, and so on. Only undecided voters can be con-
vinced. Not all interactions result in an undecided voter
being convinced: persuasion occurs only with probability
r. Models of opinion spreading with similar features have
been introduced recently [18, 19].
We implement the process by representing the elec-
torate of a party as a set of tree-like communities of vot-
ers, with candidates as roots, as shown schematically in
Fig. 3. We have as many independent trees as candi-
dates, and each candidate acts on the nodes of its own
tree, representing the voters within its sphrere of influ-
ence, and not on the others. The distribution p(k) of
the number k of contacts of a voter has to be broad, as
there are very active people that try to convince as many
voters as possible, as well as less active ones, that do
not feel particularly involved or motivated. We assume
therefore that p(k) is described by a power law, i.e. that
the probability p(k) that a voter has k acquaintances is
p(k) ∼ k−α, with α > 1. To completely fix the distribu-
4tion p(k), we fix the lower bound of k, that we indicate
with kmin.
Every iteration of the process consists in the persuaded
voters trying to convince their undecided contacts, each
with probability r. One keeps track of the running num-
ber of convinced voters, which increases with time. The
process stops when this number equals N , where N is the
size of the electorate of that party in the constituency.
Our model is similar to a collection of branching processes
evolving in parallel, coupled via the condition that they
stop when the total number of convinced voters reaches
N . Branching processes have a large number of appli-
cations in the physics literature, from modeling of forest
fires [20], to percolation [21], to self-organized critical-
ity [22]. It is important to stress, however, that our model
is not a usual branching process, but a full-fledged new
process, with different and nontrivial properties. The
key point is that, while in branching processes once a
node has decided how to branch it remains frozen, here
convinced voters keep trying to persuade their contacts:
branching events can occur at any point in the trees.
We study the dynamics of our model by means of com-
puter simulations. For each choice of the parameters α,
kmin and r, that we consider, we repeat the process sev-
eral times. Each time we store the number of votes re-
ceived by every candidate. When enough scores are col-
lected, the histogram P (v,Q,N) is determined.
The distribution P (v,Q,N), obtained via numerical
simulations, exhibits the scaling properties of the empir-
ical distribution, i.e. it obeys Eq. 1. In Fig. 2 we fit
the model distribution to the empirical curve. To ac-
count for finite size effects, we ran the simulations on the
same set of values for Q and N that occur in the empir-
ical datasets. and convoluted the resulting curves. The
model curve of Fig. 2 is the convolution of the distribu-
tions obtained from each pair of Q and N , for α = 2.45,
kmin = 10 and r = 0.25: the agreement is remarkable.
The histogram F (vQ/N) depends rather slowly on the
three model parameters α, kmin and r; besides, the de-
creasing part of the curve is very robust [15].
We have shown that election data reveal impressive
regularities when the role of policy-related issues is fac-
tored out so that the voter dynamics only relies on the
contact of the candidates with the voters. This pattern
of behavior is the same in different countries and times
and hence is affected neither by individual features of the
voters nor by the environment where the voters live. We
conclude that the underlying voting dynamics is elemen-
tary and can be described by simple statistical physics
models. A branching-like process representing the prop-
agation of word of mouth reproduces the universal distri-
bution of votes for candidates. We expect this universal-
ity to hold for other countries where the electoral system
is (or will be in the future) proportional with open lists.
As a potential application of our results, since the rel-
ative performance of a candidate in a list has the same
distribution everywhere, the index vQ/N is an objective
estimate of the popularity of a candidate, independently
of the constituency and the year of the election; this gives
parties an unbiased quantitative basis to decide internal
rankings and hierarchies.
Word of mouth spreading is a crucial ingredient to ex-
plain other instances of collective social dynamics, such
as the spreading of news and fads in a population and
the diffusion of new products among potential consumers.
From the analysis of these processes other signatures of
universality may emerge. This research direction may
strengthen the confidence on the applicability of statisti-
cal physics to explain large scale social dynamics.
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